This study examines how the adoption of inflation-targeting influenced exchange rate pass-through and volatility in four Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) over the sample period of January 1990 to June 2007. We find that reforming policy by adopting inflation targeting generally helped reduce pass-through in Korea and Thailand, while the results are less clear in Indonesia and the Philippines. Still, the findings indicate that inflation targeting has caused a decline in exchange rate volatility in all four countries. The important lesson from the experiences of these Asian countries is that the adoption of inflation targeting contributes to achieving the ultimate goal of inflation stability through reducing exchange rate pass-through or variability.
Introduction
Exchange rates, which are among the most important variables used in modeling open economies, strongly influence monetary policy. Following the 1997 Asian financial crises, crisis-affected countries and many emerging economies, facing a world of highly volatile capital flows-notwithstanding the "fear of floating" that is often observed-have moved towards adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime (see, e.g., Calvo & Reinhart, 2002) . With the more widespread adoption of a floating exchange rate regime, the adoption of inflation targeting is now at the center of monetary policy discussions. Many hope that it will prove to be an effective way to improve policy performance, as in developed countries, most of which adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s.
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Asian countries are following this trend. To date, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and
Thailand have adopted a combination of a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting.
Such a structural reform seems to diminish the importance of managing exchange rates in policy debates in emerging countries. This does not, however, imply that exchange rates have vanished from policy discussions. Indeed, many questions related to exchange rates and inflation targeting figure prominently in such discussions. The fundamental question is whether or not inflation targeting contributes to price stability through external trade channels associated with exchange rate movements. This question is crucial for policymakers who oversee small open economies, like those in Asian countries, which rely heavily on external trade. This paper considers how exchange rates, price levels, and inflation targeting in Asian countries are related by addressing two policy issues: First, how has the adoption of inflation targeting affected the magnitude of pass-through from exchange rates to domestic prices? Second, how has inflation targeting affected the variability of exchange rates? In this study we direct these questions to Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand to examine empirically the impact of such a policy regime on price stabilization.
Many empirical studies analyze exchange rate pass-through to understand the inflationary transmission mechanism in various economic environments. Among them, Campa and Goldberg (2002) , in their study on 25 OECD countries, suggest that passthrough tends to be lower for countries with low inflation as well as low exchange rate variability. Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) , in their study on 20 industrial countries, assert that monetary policy in stabilizing inflation plays a vital role in reducing the pass-through.
More recently, Choudri and Hakura (2006) , covering 71 countries, find a positive relation between pass-through and the average inflation rate. These results could strengthen the argument of Taylor (2000) in the sense that a low inflationary environment leads to a decline in exchange rate pass-through. 2 In addition to the pass-through issue, policymakers have also been concerned about exchange rate volatility since fluctuations in the exchange rate could pose a threat to the inflation target. Although it is generally believed that inflation targeting could function well under a floating exchange-rate regime, some argue that the combination of inflation targeting and a floating regime might cause exchange rate volatility to increase, so that such volatility is one of the costs of inflation targeting. Gali and Monacelli (2005) emphasize that inflation targeting would entail substantially higher exchange rate volatility. However, Chile's experience with inflation targeting, as mentioned in Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002) , 2 Some studies attempt to explain this phenomenon by considering the prevalence of producer currency pricing over local currency pricing of imports and whether exchange rates are endogenous to a country's inflation performance. See Campa & Goldberg (2002) and Devereux & Engel (2003) .
indicates that the volatility of nominal exchange rates has been no higher under inflation targeting than in other countries with floating exchange rate regimes. The recent study by Edwards (2006) , covering seven countries with some extensions to Chile, shows that inflation targeting does not result in an increase in exchange rate volatility and emphasizes that inflation targeting helps reduce unexpected shocks by making monetary policy transparent and predictable.
In this regard, recent studies on the exchange-rate pass-through or volatility issues have focused on Asian countries. The empirical work of Ito and Sato (2006) , covering the period of 1993 to 2005, seems to demonstrate that pass-through to the consumer price index (CPI) is relatively low compared with that to the producer price index (PPI) in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea. Cortinhas (2007) also investigates pass-through in five ASEAN countries over the period of 1968 to 2001 and finds that exchange rates disconnect from pass-through in Singapore and Malaysia, while the Philippines and Thailand exhibit some evidence of pass-through. 3 In addition, extant empirical evidence concerning exchange rate volatility in Asian countries focuses mainly on its impact on trade (see, e.g., Rahmatsyah et al., 2002; Siregar & Rajan, 2004; Baak et al., 2007) . To the best of our knowledge, few studies have taken into consideration the effect of inflation targeting on exchange rate pass-through and volatility in Asian countries, and this paper would therefore seem to be one of the first attempts to investigate how inflation targeting is related to exchange-rate pass-through and volatility for Asian countries.
Our results indicate that, with the adoption of inflation targeting, the degree of pass-through declined for either the PPI or the CPI in Korea and Thailand, although the evidence is less clear in Indonesia and the Philippines. The degree of inflationary inertia plays an important role in determining the magnitude of pass-through. There is, additionally, some evidence that the adoption of inflation targeting reduces exchange rate volatility in all countries, while reform in the direction of a floating regime has positively affected exchange rate variability. This is consistent with the results of various empirical studies, such as Edwards (2006) and Rose (2007) , but it contrasts with Gali and Monacelli (2005) . Interestingly, two very different effects on exchange rate volatility-one associated with a reform that involves a transition toward a floating regime and the other associated with a reform that involves inflation targeting under a floating regime-appear to cancel each other out. The most important implication of our results is that inflation targeting could be effective in stabilizing price levels and lowering inflation volatility through either of two channels: reduced exchange rate pass-through and exchange rate volatility. Portions of our results are consistent with evidence adduced by Edwards (2006) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical analysis and evaluates how inflation targeting has influenced exchange-rate pass-through and exchange rate volatility in each country. Based on the estimated results, we discuss the role of inflation targeting as a monetary policy measure for the purpose of price stabilization. Section 3 offers concluding remarks.
Empirical Analysis
Any new direction in monetary policy should emphasize price stability. Since inflation targeting has been successfully adopted by several industrialized countries, it has become increasingly attractive as a policy measure in developing economies as well. Indeed, some 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Exchange rate pass-through indicates how changes in nominal exchange rates affect domestic prices. The question is whether the adoption of inflation targeting leads to a corresponding reduction in exchange rate pass-through. Following the studies by Campa and Goldberg (2002), Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) , and Edwards (2006), we estimate the following model for each country: Notice that the FLT variable is not included for the Philippines because a floating exchange rate regime was adopted in the Philippines in 1970. Equation (1) is specified as the first-differenced form as price and the exchange rate have unit roots at the level of the series (see Table 1 ).
The coefficients of exchange rate represent pass-through elasticity. 6 Short-run passthrough before the floating exchange rate regime is β 1 while long-run pass-through is β 1 /(1-β 3 ). Under the floating exchange rate regime without inflation targeting, short-run passthrough becomes β 1 +β 4 and long-run pass-through is (β 1 +β 4 )/(1-β 3 -β 5 ). Furthermore, when the effect of inflation targeting is taken into consideration, short-run pass-through during the post-inflation targeting period becomes β 1 +β 4 +β 6 and long-run pass-through in the post-inflation targeting period is (β 1 +β 4 +β 6 )/(1-β 3 -β 5 -β 7 ). It should be noted that there are two implications of incorporating the coefficients of ∆lnP t-1 . First, doing so enables us to assess whether a stronger anti-inflationary policy decreases inflationary inertia (Taylor, 2000) and it also furnishes another channel through which inflation targeting may lower long-run pass-through (Edwards, 2006) .
To estimate the model, this study applies ordinary least squares (OLS) and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), the latter of which allows for the correlation of error terms across equations, following several previous studies (e.g., Campa & Goldberg, 2002; Gagnon & Ihrig, 2004; Edwards, 2006) . 7 The exchange rate pass-through to the CPI and the PPI are respectively estimated for Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand There may be a potential endogeneity problem with the estimated equation. As emphasized in various studies such as Meese & Kenneth (1983) and Edwards (2006) , there may be no particular technique that is appropriate to deal with this problem. One possible approach is to apply simultaneous equation methods, such as two-stage least-squares (TSLS) and generalized methods of moments (GMM). It is, however, generally difficult to find reliable instrumental variables.
while other variables are stationary not at the level but at the first difference. Tables 2 and   3 report the empirical results of exchange rate pass-through for the OLS and the SUR.
These methods yield similar estimates, suggesting that the analysis based on the OLS may not lose generality. Table 4 provides a summary of the pass-through coefficients, which notably capture short-run and long-run pass-through to the CPI and the PPI during the periods of the pre-floating exchange rate regime, the floating exchange rate regime without inflation targeting, and the floating exchange rate regime with inflation targeting. 8 We first find that the short-run and long-run pass-throughs to the PPI are greater than either is to the CPI for all countries during each of the three sub-periods. This suggests that exchange rate fluctuations are transmitted more easily to producer prices than to consumer prices. Since services account for a large proportion of the CPI, a lesspronounced pass-through to the CPI is not surprising. The relatively large pass-through to the PPI may come about partly because the PPI consists largely of tradable goods, such as agricultural products. A simple implication is that the pass-through rate declines as one moves down along the distribution channel. This is consistent with the results of previous studies (see, e.g., McCarthy, 2000; Hahn, 2003; Faruqee, 2004; Edwards, 2006; Ito & Sato, 2006) .
Our results also suggest that long-run pass-through depends not only on the coefficients of ∆lnE t but also on inflation inertia, which can be captured by the coefficients of ∆lnP t-1 .
The estimated coefficients of ∆lnP t-1 in Table 2 shows that, except for the PPI in the 8 The method of calculation is the same as that used in Edwards (2006) . The short-run pass-through during the period of the pre-floating regime is the coefficient on ∆lnE t . The long-run pass-through during the period of the pre-floating regime is equal to the short-run pass-through if the coefficient of ∆lnP t-1 is insignificant, and it is equal to the short-run pass-through divided by one minus the coefficient of ∆lnP t-1 if the coefficient of ∆lnP t-1 is significant.The short-run pass-through during the period of the floating regime without inflation targeting is the coefficient of ∆lnE t if the coefficient of FLT*∆lnE t is insignificant, and it is the sum of the coefficients of ∆lnE t and FLT*∆lnE t if the coefficient of FLT*∆lnE t is significant. The other short-run pass-through and long-run pass-through are also calculated in the same manner.
Philippines, inflation is characterized by a marked degree of inflationary inertia, in virtue of which current inflation is significantly influenced by lagged inflation. This result implies that, due to the existence of inflation inertia, long-run pass-through is generally greater than short-run pass-through in all countries. Moreover, the relatively large coefficients of ∆lnP t-1 for the CPI compared with those for the PPI indicates that the degree of inflation inertia is generally greater for the CPI than for the PPI (see, e.g., Edward, 2006 ).
We also demonstrate that the adoption of the floating exchange rate regime does not have a clear effect on pass-through to the CPI and PPI in Thailand, given that the estimated coefficients of ∆lnE t × FLT and ∆lnP t-1 × FLT are not significant in Table 2 . On the other hand, the adoption of the floating regime has a significant impact on passthrough to the PPI in Indonesia and to both the PPI and the CPI in Korea. Interestingly, the adoption has the opposite impact on pass-through in these countries. The significantly negative coefficients of ∆lnE t × FLT and ∆lnP t-1 × FLT for Indonesia show the declines in short-run and long-run pass-through to the PPI, while the significantly positive coefficients in Korea imply the rise in short-run and long-run pass-through to the CPI and the PPI.
More importantly, our estimated results suggest that the adoption of inflation targeting under the floating exchange rate regime induced the decline in pass-through in Korea and Thailand, although there is no clear evidence with respect to Indonesia and the Philippines (Table 2 ). In Korea, the significantly negative coefficients of ∆lnP t-1 × DIT in the CPI equation and ∆lnE t × DIT and ∆lnP t-1 × DIT in the PPI equation imply the decline in long-run pass-through to the CPI and in short-run and long-run pass-through to the PPI.
In Thailand, the negative coefficient of ∆lnP t-1 × DIT in the PPI equation indicates the decline in long-run pass-through to the PPI. The decline in the degree of inflation inertia associated with inflation targeting plays an important role in decreasing long-run passthrough in these countries. In fact, our results with respect to Korea and Thailand are consistent with those in Edwards (2006) on some emerging economies such as Chile and Mexico.
Alternative Approach for Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Our empirical analysis in the previous section provides evidence that inflation targeting reduces pass-through in Korea and Thailand, even though the results are not significant when applied to Indonesia and the Philippines. We now estimate a VAR model to assess the robustness of these results. Since exchange rates and inflation rates are endogenously determined, the estimation of their relationship in the VAR framework may be a more appropriate method of analysis (Ito & Sato, 2006) . In addition, VAR analysis may provide an advantage over single-equation analysis in that it allows us to examine the effects of structural shocks.
We attempt to investigate how the CPI and PPI respond to exchange rate shocks using the impulse response functions ( in Thailand). The sub-sample examinations aim at identifying how pass-through to the CPI and the PPI has changed after the adoption of inflation targeting in each country.
For these purposes, we follow Ito and Sato (2006) do not respond contemporaneously to other structural shocks. In other words, the variables that appear first in the ordering are assumed to have no contemporaneous response to shocks generated by the variables that follow. The order of the endogenous variables should be justified by appropriate economic intuitions. For example, the price variable is placed last in the order on the assumption that it responds contemporaneously to shocks from the US PPI, the output gap, the money supply, and the nominal effective exchange rate, while these other variables are not contemporaneously influenced by price shocks. 
Exchange Rate Volatility
Inflation-targeting regimes have provoked considerable controversy over 'fear of floating.'
Many believe that the adoption of inflation targeting incurs some economic costs associated with rising exchange rate volatility since, it is argued, it necessarily requires a floating exchange rate regime (see, e.g., Mishkin & Savastano, 2001 , for a discussion of As in the previous estimation, we take monthly data over the period of January 1990
to June 2007 to estimate the GARCH model for each of the four countries. We use the same dataset as in the previous subsections and take the interest rate date from IFS. 10 We order the GARCH model as follows: GARCH (2,2), GARCH (1,2), GARCH (2,1), and GARCH (2,0) apply to Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, respectively, according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
Our main concern in this model is whether or not inflation targeting under a floating exchange rate regime causes nominal effective exchange rates to be more volatile. Since a policy reform that involves a transition toward a floating exchange rate regime increases exchange rate volatility, the estimated coefficient of FLT is expected to be positive. The impact of the adoption of inflation targeting under a floating exchange rate regime can be evaluated through the sign of the estimated coefficient of DIT. A positive coefficient means that increased exchange rate volatility is associated with the adoption of inflation targeting (Mishkin & Savastano, 2001; Gali & Monacelli, 2005) , while a negative coefficient implies that inflation targeting helps reduce exchange rate volatility. If the latter is the case, we may conclude that inflation targeting is effective in reducing the social cost associated with exchange rate variability. Table 5 shows the main results, which include the estimated coefficients of FLT and DIT. First, the coefficient of FLT is significantly positive for Indonesia, Korea, and
Thailand. This confirms the conventional argument in favor of increased fluctuation under a 10 The differential between domestic and foreign prices is based on the log of PPI for the domestic country and the US. The interest rate differentials consist of the difference between the US federal funds rate and the domestic short-term interest rate in each country. For the short-term interest rates we use the money market rate for Indonesia and Korea and the discount rate for the Philippines and Thailand. All data is taken from IFS.
floating exchange rate regime. Recall that the FLT variable is not included for the Philippines because a floating exchange rate regime was adopted in 1970. Second, the coefficients on DIT are negative and significant for all countries. Thus, adopting inflation targeting tends to decrease conditional exchange rate volatility under a floating exchange rate regime. Third, the increment in conditional volatility derived from the floating exchange rate regime is almost canceled out by a reduction in conditional volatility as a result of adopting inflation targeting in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. These results are generally consistent with those that pertain to Chile and Brazil in Edwards (2006) and Rose (2007) .
One possible explanation for the reduction in exchange rate volatility during the post-inflation-targeting period is that inflation targeting makes monetary policies more transparent and predictable, which could help reduce unexpected external shocks. Another explanation may be that some intervention remains essential for central banks even under a floating rate regime in order to smooth excessive variability of exchange rates in relatively small foreign exchange markets. 11 As emphasized by Ho and McCauley (2003) , market intervention and capital control are required to achieve an inflation target for emerging economies, which tend to be more exposed to exchange rate movements.
Although a central bank while adopting inflation targeting pays attention primarily to price stability by formally committing to an explicit inflation target, the stability of exchange rates is a major concern as well (see, e.g., Sarno & Taylor, 2001 ). Inflation targeting implies neither 'benign neglect' of the exchange rate nor avoidance of foreign exchange rate market intervention (see Mishkin 2004) . The central bank is required to 11 Since the exchange rate matters due to its impact on inflation as well as on the functioning of markets, it is often claimed that exchange rate management is particularly essential for emerging countries to assure the tradable sector's competitiveness as well as financial stability. Mohanty & Klau (2004) discuss how central banks in emerging countries react to exchange rate variability. Several emerging economies have intervenedoften on a large scale-to stabilize the exchange rate by adjusting interest rates.
make it clear to the public that the primary goal is still inflation control; meanwhile, such an intervention aims to smooth excessive exchange rate volatility, but not to distort its market-determined level in the long-run.
Inflation Volatility
The foregoing discussions illustrate the proposition that price stability can be achieved by the adoption of inflation targeting through reduced exchange rate pass-through and volatility. As exchange rate pass-through and exchange rate volatility are prominent sources of inflation variability, we expect that inflation targeting also contributes to reduced inflation volatility. To verify this argument, this section directly examines the effect of inflation targeting on inflation volatility for each country under study, using the framework of the GARCH model. The GARCH specification is described as: 
where P t is the domestic price (PPI); the x j 's and y k 's represent other explanatory variables in the mean and variance equations, respectively; and the ε t is a disturbance with the properties of zero mean and conditional variance . As in the previous section, we incorporate DIT and FLT into the variance equation to capture the effects of the floating exchange rate and inflation-targeting regimes. In addition, we include the log of NEER, the log of the US PPI, interest rate differentials, and a dummy variable for the Asian crisis in the mean equation. We order the GARCH model as follows: GARCH (2,2), GARCH (3,1), GARCH (2,1), and GARCH (2,0) for Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, respectively, according to the AIC. Table 6 shows the estimated results of the GARCH model for each of the four countries over the sample period of January 1990 to June 2007. The estimated coefficients of DIT are significantly negative for Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, while the corresponding coefficient is insignificant for Indonesia. Therefore, inflation volatility tends to shrink during inflation targeting periods even though floating increases the volatility.
Our results thus vindicate the supposition that inflation targeting can contribute to inflation stability without causing a rise in inflation volatility through reduced exchange rate passthrough and exchange rate volatility.
Conclusion
In this paper, we verify the position that the adoption of inflation targeting can have an important effect on exchange rate pass-through and exchange rate volatility, using data from four crisis-afflicted Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. One important lesson we can draw from the experiences of these countries is that inflation targeting has helped achieve its primary objective of price stability through a decline in exchange-rate pass-through or exchange rate volatility, a possible complement to a expected reduction in inflation. Another important result is that there is no evidence that adopting inflation targeting increases nominal exchange rate volatility, whereas monetary reform in the direction of a floating regime raises exchange rate volatility. Indeed, we have shown that the adoption of inflation targeting would tend to offset any increase in exchange rate volatility associated with the adoption of a floating regime.
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. Notes: 1) The accumulated impulse responses of CPI and PPI are shown.
2) All shocks are standardized to a 1% shock. 3) The vertical axis represents the approximate percentage change in response to a 1% exchange rate shock, while the horizontal axis demonstrates the time horizon (1 through 10 months). 4) The dotted line denotes a two-standard-error confidence band around the estimate. 2) The null hypothesis of the ADF and PP tests is that the variable is non-stationary. 3) For the log level of variables, the intercept and time trend are included, whereas only the intercept is included for the first difference of variables. 2) E t is the multilateral effective exchange rate, P t * is the US producer price index, P t-1 is a lag of the domestic consumer or producer price index, FLT is a dummy for periods with a floating exchange rate regime, and DIT is a dummy for periods with inflation targeting.
3) The single asterisk (*) and double asterisks (**) denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 2) E t is the multilateral effective exchange rate, P t * is the US producer price index, P t-1 is a lag of the domestic consumer or producer price index, FLT is a dummy for periods with a floating exchange rate regime, and DIT is a dummy for periods with inflation targeting. 3) The single asterisk (*) and double asterisks (**) denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 2) The asterisks (*,**) indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
3) DIT is a dummy for periods with inflation targeting, while FLT is a dummy for periods with floating exchange rates. 4) The Philippines embarked on its floating exchange rate regime in 1970. 5) The lags of GARCH models are decided according to the AIC. 2) The asterisks (*,**) indicate significance at the 5%and 10% levels, respectively.
3) DIT is a dummy for periods with inflation targeting, while FLT is a dummy for periods with floating exchange rates. 4) The Philippines embarked on its floating exchange rate regime in 1970. 5) The lags of GARCH models are decided according to the AIC.
